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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
DUFFY V. CBS CORP.: UNDER THE STATUTE OF REPOSE A
CAUSE OF ACTION RELATED TO ASBESTOS EXPOSURE
ARISES ON THE PLAINTIFF’S LAST DATE OF EXPOSURE
By: Rena Neuman
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the statute of repose did not
bar plaintiff’s claims because the asbestos-related injury occurred before the
statute’s enactment. Duffy v. CBS Corp., 458 Md. 206, 223-24, 182 A.3d 166,
176-77 (2018). The court used the exposure approach to determine whether
the injury arose prior to the enactment of the statute of repose. Id. at 224, 182
A.3d at 176. Additionally, the court held that although the discovery rule may
impact the statute of limitations in latent injury cases, it has no legal impact
on the temporal limitation imposed by the statute of repose. Id. at 234, 182
A.3d at 183.
In March of 1970, CBS Corporation (“Westinghouse”) contracted with
Potomac Electric Power Company (“Pepco”) to build a generator at Pepco’s
Generating Station. Unknown to James F. Piper (“Piper”), a steamfitter on the
site, the insulating materials contained asbestos. As a result, Piper was
exposed to asbestos between May 3, 1970 and June 28, 1970. Three days later,
the statute of repose was enacted on July 1, 1970. The statute of repose created
a twenty-year limitation for causes of action for injuries arising from
improvements to real property, starting from the date that the real property
improvements are substantially completed.
On December 26, 2013, forty-three years after his exposure to asbestos,
Piper was diagnosed with mesothelioma. Following his diagnosis, Piper sued
Westinghouse in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City for strict liability, breach
of warranty, negligence, and aiding and abetting conspiracy. Westinghouse
filed a motion for summary judgement, arguing that Piper’s claims were timebarred by the statute of repose, because Piper’s mesothelioma diagnosis was
outside of the statute’s twenty-year limitation. The Circuit Court for
Baltimore City granted Westinghouse’s motion for summary judgement,
finding that Piper’s applicable claim was his diagnosis. Piper appealed to the
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, arguing that his injury was the asbestos
exposure that occurred before the enactment of the statute of repose. The Court
of Special Appeals of Maryland affirmed the lower court’s ruling, holding that
Piper’s injury was his mesothelioma diagnosis in 2013 which was outside the
twenty-year temporal limitation. Upon Piper’s death, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland granted certiorari to the Personal Representative of Piper’s estate,
June Diane Duffy.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland began its analysis by evaluating the brief
history of the statute of repose, formally enacted as Courts and Judicial
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Proceedings § 5–108 (”CJP § 5–108”). Duffy, 458 Md. at 222, 182 A.3d at
174. The court explained that the purpose of the statute was to protect
defendants against elongated claims for injuries arising from improvements to
real property. Id. Next, the court discussed the issue of whether the statute of
repose barred Piper’s claims. Id. at 210, 182 A.3d at 168.
To determine the applicability of the statute of repose, the court had to
decide when Piper’s claim arose. Duffy, 458 Md. at 223-24, 182 A.3d at 176.
The issue before the court was whether the injury arose at the time of the initial
exposure to asbestos or at the time of the resulting diagnosis. Id. at 223-24,
182 A.3d at 176. To resolve this, the court applied the exposure approach,
which requires the court to look at a plaintiff’s last possible date of exposure
to the asbestos-containing product. Id. at 223, 182 A.3d at 176 (citing John
Crane Inc. v. Scribner, 369 Md. 369, 394, 800 A.2d 727, 742 (2002)).
In applying the exposure approach, the Court of Appeals of Maryland
determined that the underlying cause of the injury was instrumental in
asbestos-related cases because without a cause, there would be no resulting
disease. Duffy, 458 Md. at 223, 182 A.3d at 176 (citing John Crane Inc., 369
Md. at 394, 800 A.2d at 742). The court further noted that the mesothelioma
diagnosis only alerted Piper to the injury that he suffered on a previous date.
Duffy, 458 Md. at 225, 182 A.3d at 177. Thus, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland found that the applicable injury was the asbestos exposure, which
last occurred three days before the statute of repose was enacted. Id. at 224,
182 A.3d at 176.
After determining when the injury came into existence, the court analyzed
the specific construction and general applicability of CJP § 5–108 to decide
whether the statute applied retroactively or prospectively. Duffy, 458 Md. at
224-25, 182 A.3d at 176-77. Assessing the plain meaning of CJP § 5–108, the
court recognized that the applicability of the statute was limited to claims
arising after the statute’s enactment. Id. at 223, 182 A.3d at 176 (citing MD.
CTS. & JUD. PROC. Code Ann. § 5-108 (1991)). Generally, unless the statute
clearly states to the contrary, there is a presumption that statutes apply
prospectively. Duffy, 458 Md. at 224, 182 A.3d at 177. Therefore, because
the statute went into effect after the last possible day of Piper’s exposure to
asbestos, the court concluded that the statute did not apply in this case. Id. at
224-26, 182 A.3d at 176-77.
Next, the court addressed the applicability of the discovery rule in asbestosrelated cases. Duffy, 458 Md. at 231, 182 A.3d at 180-81. The discovery rule
implies that the statute of limitations in a civil action is tolled until the plaintiff
discovers he has a cause of action. Duffy, 458 Md. at 231, 182 A.3d at 181.
The rule recognizes that in cases involving latent diseases, the happening of
the wrong and the knowledge of it often do not occur simultaneously. Id. at
231-34, 182 A.3d at 180-84. Similarly, the court explained that in asbestosrelated cases the injury does not arise and accrue at the same time. Id. On that
basis, the court found that when the discovery rule applies, the three-year
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statute of limitations in a civil action is tolled until the plaintiff discovers he
has a cause of action. Here, Piper’s claim fell within the statute of limitations
because he filed his claim within three-years of his diagnosis. Id.
Furthermore, the court noted that had the discovery rule applied to the
statute of repose, as the Court of Special Appeals erroneously presumed, then
Piper’s 2013 diagnosis would have been the applicable injury, occurring
outside the twenty-year time limitation imposed by the statute of repose.
Duffy, 458 Md. at 231-34, 182 A.3d at 180-84. By distinguishing the exposure
from the diagnosis, the court allowed Piper to proceed with his claim. Id. The
court emphasized that because the cause of action arose before the statute of
repose became effective, the statute could not bar Piper’s claims even though
the cause of action accrued more than twenty-years after his exposure. Id. at
236, 182 A.3d at 183.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland concluded that Piper’s injury was the
asbestos exposure that occurred before the statute of repose was enacted.
Further, the court held that the discovery rule did not impact the court’s
decision regarding the applicability of the statute of repose. This holding
essentially alters the meaning of injury. Instead of considering the resulting
injury, the court recognized the significance of cause and progression.
Additionally, this holding clarifies that while the statute of limitations in latent
injury cases is tolled until the plaintiff discovers he has a cause of action, the
statute of repose runs regardless of when the injury is discovered. In this case,
the only factor preventing the claim from being barred was its occurrence
before the statute’s enactment. Consequently, plaintiffs exposed to asbestos
after the enactment of the statute may be prevented from suing defendants
more than twenty-years after exposure, regardless of when the damages are
discovered.

